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DIGEST OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS
FDITD - BY

ALFRED ROLAND HAIG.

ADMIRALTY.
Casesselected by HOnAC L.

CH4YNny.

MARIT1Mi LuGISLATION.

x. State Statutes-Aciionsfor Death.
A State statute giving damages for death by negligence, as applied
to a negligent collision on navigable'waters within the State, is 'ialid.
An action to recover such. damages is for a tort, which by its nature and
locality is i maritime tort, and as such is within the ancient jurisdiction
of the District Court, and equally so whether the right of action is given
by State or by Federal legislation. Though no lien is raised 'byimplication, the statutory right may be efnforced by an admiralty proceeding in
fersonam. The grounds of action are not statutory, but only the right to
a remedy, which it is competent for the State to enact in the absence of
legislation by Congress, and which, under the provisions of the limited
liability acts (Rev. St. U. S.,A 4283-428), as interpreted by the Supreme
Court, it is incumbent on the District Court to recognize and enforce :
The City of Norwalk, Distritt. Court of the United Statesi Southern
District of.New York, BROWN J., Marclj27, I89, 55 red. Rep.., 98.
SALVAGM.

2. Award-Righl of Chartererto Share.
A steamer was chartered to carry a cargo to:a certain port. The'
charter party provided that the steamer'should "have'liberty to tow and
be towed, and to assist vessels in all situations ;" and the bill of lading
provided that she should' have liberty to tow and assist vessels in distress, and to deyiate for the purpose of saving. life or property.i ' Thie
master and crew were in full control and charge of the steamer during
the whole voyage, subject to no orders from the cliarterer, and there was
no supercargo aboard, During.the voyage she rendered salvage services
to another vessel, and wgs thereby delayed for several days. Held, that'
the charterer was not entitled to any damages for the delay occasioned
by the services rendered: "The Brirham," District Qourt of the United
States, Eastern District of Virginia, HUdH3S, J., March z, 1893, 54 Fed.
Rep., 529.
3. Rights of Shipper-Effect of Bill of Lading.
A provision of a bill of lading for part of the cargo of a salving ship,
that the ship might "tow and assist vessels in all situations . . .
without the same being deemed a deviation," does not make the shipper,
a joint.salvor to the extent of his interest in the cargo jeopardized. A

692

CARRIERS AND TRANSPORTATION COMPANIES.

shipper taking such a bill of lading naturally looks to insurance for protection, and cannot be deemed to turn his contract of affreightment into a
salvage expedition. As a consequence, the interest of such a shipper is
not to be counted in arriving at the value of the cargo risked to effect
the salvage. "The Blaire.au," 2 Cranch, 240, distinguished: "The
Depuy de Loure," District Court of the United States, Eastern District
of Louisiana, BILIxGs; J., March 28, 1893, 55 Fed. Rep., 93.

CARRIERS AND TRANSPORTATION COMPANIES.
Cases selected by OwBN WISTBR.
CARRIBRS.
i. MerchandiseShipped as Baggage-Negligence.
When a passenger bought a ticket and checked a trunk in the
ordinary manner, making no mention of its contents, upon the trunk
being burned and the contents destroyed by an accident, the company's
liability, will be limited as for personal baggage, though, as a matter of
fact, the trunk contained jewelry, which the passenger, a salesman, had
intended selling to his principal customers. T4e price of a ticket makes
a railroad company responsible for the loss of ordinary personal effects,
and, is proportionable to the risk the carrier was in transporting suci
effects; but not effects of extraordinary value: Humphreys v. Perry,
April IO, 1893, 13 Supreme Court Rep., 7rI. See Gibbon v. Paynton, 4
Burr., 2298; Batson v. Donovan, 4 Barn. & Ald., 2r; Alliay v. R. R. Co.,
126 Mass., 121; Millard v. R. R. Co., 86 N. Y., 441.
2.

Passenger,Ejection of-Fare Paidon Train.

Railway companies may require passengers to purchase tickets
before taking passage upon trains, and in case facilities for so purchasing
tickets are provided, those who do not purchase tickets may be required
to pay an extra fare upon the train: Sage v. Evansville & T. H. R. Co.,
Supreme Court of Indiana, March Ui, 1893, 33 N. E. Rep., 77X; Ry. Co:
vz. Vandyke, 57 Ind., 576; Falkner v. Ry. Co., 55 Ind., 369; Ry. Co. v.
[Query: Where a
Rogers, 28 Ind., i; Ry. Co., v. Rinard, 46 Ind., 293.
station is closed before train time habitually, so a passenger is unable to
buy a ticket, from whence is the company's right to charge him extra
fare derived ?-O. W.]
Passenger, Injury to, while Aligh'ting-Failure of Carrie
to Stop Train-Negligence-nstructions-Assumptionof
Facts.
The plaintiff offered evidence tending to show that he was invited to
take a free ride by the conductor of a train, who agreed to put him down
between stations; and that under the conductor's instructions (the train
not stopping to let him off) he jumped off, and was hurt. The Court
instructed the jury that if they believed this, that the conductor had
not, as agreed, stopped to let the plaintiff off, but advised him to jump,
3.
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telling him it was not dangerous, and that under the circumstances it did
not appear to the plaintiff to be dangerous to get off the train at the*
time, and that acting under the direction and advice of said conductor,'
he attempted to get off, and in doing so was violently thrown down and
injured, then the plaintiff was entitled to recover from defendant the
actual damages sustained by him. Held, erroneous. It is beyond the
province of the Court to declare that certain acts enumerated constitute
negligence; this is to be determined by the jury: Gulf C. & S. F. Ry.
Co. v. Bagley, Court of Civil-Appeals of Texas, April i9, 1893, 22 S. W.
Rep., 68.
In Thomas v. Charlotte, C. & A. Ry. Co., Supreme Court of South
Carolina, March i8, 1893, f7 S. U. Rep., 226, the facts are materially the
same as those in the case preceding, except that th6 plaintiff was not
traveling upon invitation, but paid his fare. The plaintiffs complaint
averred that the defendant "negligently refused to stop the train . . .
but obliged the plaintiff to jump from said car while it was in -rapid
motion." . . . The import of the words, "obliged the plaintiff to
jump," does not appear in the report. A non-suit was moved for and
entered with judgment thereon. Appealed. Reversed.
NEGLIGENCE.
4. Injury to Personon Railroad Track-ProximateCause.
The plaintiff, q child of 6, with her family took passage for a station
at which they proceeded to alight when the train stopped there. Part of
them were off when the train went on, and the conductor told the others
they must wait and get off at the next station and walk back. The only,
way back was along the track, there being water on each side. The
track was a straight line between the two stations. On the way back the
laintiff became fiightened by the approach of a train, and, breaking
from her father's hand, ran, and was injured by the train, the fireman of
which had seen her, as had also the engineer, when- some one hundred
yards away. The train was going at fifteen miles an hour, and had not
slowed, nor was bell rung nor whistle blown. The plaintiff's father
knew that a return train was expected. Held, The plaintiff's act'could
not have been anticipated. The carrying her beyond her station was not
the proximate cause of the injury. When she leftthe car without asking
to be carried back and left where she ought to have been left, the contract relation between her and the defendant ceased: Benson v. Central
Pacific R. R. Co., Supreme Court of California, March 3 o , 1893, 32 Pac.
Rep., 8o9.
RAILROADS.
5. Regulations- Separate Accommodations for Whites and
Blacks.
Depot agents have the power, as incident to the office, to make
reasonable regulations as to the conduct of business at their depots,
respectively, unless restricted, limited or controlled in that respect. A
rule (made by such depot agent) providing for the separation of white
and colored passengers by separate waiting-rooms is, in the absence of
any statute to the contrary, not unlawful if accommodations equal in all

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW.

respects are furnished to both. A black woman applied for a ticket at
.the whites' window, and on her refusing to go to the room and window
assigned to her race, was forcibly ejected from the room by the agent.
Action by her against the receiver of the company. Judgment for
Affirmed. Smith,. el al., v. Chamberlain,
Appealed.
defendant.
Supreme Court of South Carolina, March, 1893, 17 S. . Rep., 371.

COMMERCIAL LAW.
Casesselected by FaRANcls H. BOHLN.
CONTRACT.

x. Proposalby Telegram-Acceptance.
Where the plaintiff makes a proposal by telegram, with request to
reply by telegram, and- the defendant replies by a telegrkm -vhich contains no acceptance of the proposal, but a new proposal, and no notice
that a letter is to be written, the plaintiff may treat his proposal as
rejected,,although a letter subsequently arrives accepting plaintiff's proposal: Goulding v. Hammond, Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit,
Loc,
"D.J., February 6, 1893, 54 Fed. Rep., 639.
2.
Rescission-Breach of Warranty.
On a rescission by defendant for breach of warranty of a contract
with plaintiff for the exchange of chattels, where defendant returns the
chattel received by him, and plaintiff refuses on ,demand to deliver up
the chattel in his possession, defendant may enter the premises of the
other party to reclaim his original chattel.
Where the chattel received by the defendant was a buggy, the
springs of which were warranted by plaintiff, and a spring broke without
defendant's fault, so as to cause a breach of ivarranty, defendant could
rescind by returning the buggy in its broken condition, and he.was- not
obliged to return it in the same condition in which he received it.
A purchaser of an article may examine it for himself, and exercise
his own judgment upon it, and at the same time protect himself by taking a warranty from the vendor: Smith v. Hale, Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts, ArL& N, J., March 1, 1893, N. U. Rep., 493.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Cases selected by WILLIAm STRUTnERS ]ELLIS.

Duz PRocEss

oF LAw.

Assessment for Constructionof Sewers-Notice.
A city charter which, grants, in general terms, power to the council
to construct sewers and assess the cost thereof upon the property benefited thereby, is not open to the objection that it deprives the citizen of
his property without due process of law, because it contains no express
I.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
provision for notice of such assessment. The power generally conferred
is subject to all constitutional restrictions, of which the requirement of
notice is one. The city is a miniature State; the council is its legislature; the charter is its constitution; and it is enough if in that the
power is granted in general terms, for when granted it must necessarily
be exercised subject to all limitations imposed by constitutional provisions: Paulsen v. City of Portland, Supreme Court of the United
States, BnI
ELW
> J., April 17, iF93, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep., 750.
FIDWRA.L JURISDICTION.
2.
Cilizenship-Removal.of Causes-Orderfromn FederalCourt
-Refusal of State Court.
The Removal Act of 1887, as amended in 1888, provides that when,
in a suit in a State Court, there is a controversy between a citizen of the
State in which the suit is brought and a citizen of another State, any
defendant, being such citizen of another State, may remove suct suit
into the Circuit Court of the United States on proper showing. Where
neither plintiff nor defendant is a citizen of the State in which the
action is brought, the Circuit Court has no jurisdiction, and where such
court makes an order that the cause be certified thereto, the State court
may decline to permit the removal. An order by the federal judge for
the removal, bsed on an affidavit plainly insufficient to authorize it,
does not constitute a removal of the cause, and the jurisdiction of the
State court is not theieby ousted: Lawson v. Richnond & D. R. R. Co.,
Supreme Court of North Carolina, AVERY, J., March 21, 1893, 17 S. B.
Rep., i6 9 .
3. Suits Against Counties.
Under a State Act (Arkansas, February 27, 7879) which repeals all
laws allowing suits against counties, and provides that any person haying a claim against a county must present the same to the county court
for allowance or rejection, with the right of appeal to either party from
the action theteon : Held, that the allowance or rejection of a claim
either has the form or e fect ofa judgment for or against the county from
which the appeal will lie,"or it is merely a preliminary proceedig which
may be carried into an appellate court where an actual trial is had. In
either view the rdsult is that counties are in substance and effect suable
by the local law, and, therefore, subject to a suit in a federal court by
original process: Chicot County v. Sherwood, Supreme Court of the
United States, JACKSON, J., April 3, 1893, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep., 695.
4. Supireme Court-Rehearing-Federal
Question.
A federal question cannot be raised. for the first time by a petition_
for a rehearing after judgment in the highest court of a State, so as to
bring the c~se within the appellate jurisdiction of the United States
Supreme Court: Bushnell v. Crooke Mining and Smelting Co., Supreme
Court of the United States, JAcKSON, J., Aliril 17, 1893, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep.,
i71.
t .See PLSAnmxo AND PRACTIcB, 5, 6.

696

CORPORATIONS.

OBLIGATION Ol CONTRACTS.
3. RailroadCompanies-Foredosureand Reorganization.
A New Yorkstatute (Laws, 1874, c. 43o, as amended by Laws, 1876,
c. 446) gives to the purchasers of railroad property and franchises at a
foreclosure sale the right to form a new corporation with all the rights,
powers and privileges of the old one upon filing with the Secretary of
State a certificate in forin therein prescribed. Held, that the right conferred was not a Co4tract right, but was a mere regulation of law, and
the subsec.uent Act requiring as a condition precedent to obtaining a
charter (Laws, i886, c. 143) the payment of a sum equal.to one-eighth of
x per cent. upon the proposed amount of capital stock of the new company was not, as applied to purchasers at the foreclosure of a pre-existing mortgage, an Act impairing the obligation of contracts within the
meaning of the Federal Constitution: People v.Cook, Supreme. Court
of the United States, JAcKsoN,J., April 3, x893, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep., 645.

CORPORATIONS.
Cases selected by LiWms LAWRuNCz SmiTE.
BANKS..
1. Insolvency-Preferred Claim.
The treasurer of a board of education without authority placed the
school funds in a bank of which he was manager, and the owner of which
had knowledge of the character of the funds. They were wrongfully
used in the business of the bank, and for the payment of indebtedness
against it. Afterward the owner of the bank became insolvent, and made
an assignment of his property for the benefit of creditors. The assets
which came into the hands of the assignee consisted of real property,
securities and cash. But the amount of the school money wrongfully
converted, and which was impressed with a trust, was largely in excess
of the cash on hand at the time of the assignment. The trust fund could
not be clearly traced to any particular asset in the hands of the assignee,
but it was shown to havd gone into and been used for the benefit of the
estate. It was held that the trust fund became a charge upon the entire
assets with which it was mingled, and that the board of education had a
preferred right to the assets over general creditors to the extent of the
fund converted: Myers v.Board of Education, Sipreme Court of Kansas,
JOHNSTON, J., March II, 1893, 32 Pac. Rep., 658.
BUILDING ASSOCIATIONS.

2. Withdrawal.
Knowingly and intentionally participating as a stockholder in stockholders' meetings held six and ten months after giving notice of withdrawal, constitutes a waiver of the right to withdraw under said notice:
Decatur Building & Inv. Co. v. Neal, Supreme Court of Alabama, STONE,
C. J., February 1, 1893, 12 Southern Rep., 780.

CORPORATIONS.
3. Usury.
Where a member of a building and loan association in negotiating a
.
loan for the amount of his stock agrees to pay a premium of 4o per cent
to obtain the loan, and executes his note for the whole sum loaned, bear.
ing 8 per cent. interest, the contract of loan, in that it provides for the
.payment of interest on the premium, is usurious: Sullivan V.-Jackson
e. & L. Assoc., Supreme Court of Mississippi, WooDs, J., November28,
t 892, 12 Southern Rep., 59o.
DnRCTORS.

4. PersonalLiability.
A statute of Illinois provides .that, "if the indebtedness of any stock
:corpo ration shall exceed the amount of its capital stock, the directors and
officers of such corporation assenting thereto shall be personally and indiidua lly liable for such excegs." The Court held that this statute wasto
be co nstrued strictly, and did not apply to a casewhere directors had,
recognized-the del~ts in excess of the erpital, created by one of theiinum.
ber whom. they bad allowed to manage the corporation. -The assent
referred to in the statute was the assent to the creation of the debts, not
the assent to their payment: Lewis v. Montgomery, Supreme Court of
Illinois, BAILEY, C. J., April 3, 1893, 33 N. 1 . Rep., 88o.
MUTUAL BRNexuIT ASsOCIATIoNS.

5. Secession of Majority.
Where aLlocal division of a beneficial society, by virtue of itlcolid-'
tution and by-laws, is a member of a national organization, a majority of
the local, division has nq power, against the will of the minorty, to
renounce allegiance tothe national body, and at the same time arry.
with it the; property of the local division, since the secession of the
majority deprives it of all property rights in the organization. The fact
that the subsequent proceedings of the minority in con tnuingthe organization w~re irregular, and in violation of the constitution of the national
body, does not'give the seceding majority any rights in the property of
thelocal division: Gorman v. O'Connor, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, PAR C URIAz, April 17, 1893, 26 Atl. Rep., 379.

6. Distributionof Assets.
The Orderof the Golden Lion, a mutual benefit insurance corpora.:
tion, was organized under St. 1888, c. 429, as amended by St. z8go, C. 34r,of Massachusetts, which provided that all the money derived frdm the
first-class assessments therein provided for shotild be divided into- two
funds-one to be set aside as a reserve fund.for the exclusive payxnent of
-matured indowment certificates, and the other to constitute a benefit
fund, to be applied exclusively, to the payment of disability benefitsand that no portion of the moneys so received should be used for any
other purpose. The act further provided for assessments to meet expenses.
A receiver was appointed for the corporation in' a suit to wind up its.
,affairs. -Held, that although the business prosecuted by the corporation
may have been illegal, and-ultra vires, the certificate holders were not'
entitled to recover the moneys paid by-them in assessments and initiation
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fees as for money had and received, but, in distributing the assets, each
should receive from the fund derived from assessments of the first class
A dividend in proportion to the amount paid by him into that fund.
The date of filing the bill for a receiver of the corporation is to be
taken as the date which fixes the rights of the parties.
Holders of certificates who have failed to pay assessments made on
them before'the day on'which notice of the appointment of the receiver
was berved on them, were held not entitled to prove their claims against
the assets, where the assessments were payable before that date: Fogg v.
Supreme Lodge, Supreme judicial Court of Massachusetts, ALLEN,3.,
April 7, 1893, 33 N. E. Rep., 692.
ORGANIZATION.

7. Expenses of Promoters.
A corporation is liable for the expenses of its promoters in procuring
a subscription, where, after its organization, it accepts the subscription
with a knowledge of such expenses: Weatherford, etc., R. R. Co. v.
Granger, Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, HXAD, J., March 30, 1893, 22
S. W. Rep., 70.
STOCKHOLDERS.
-8.- Righsof Ainority.
While a single stockholder may file a bill in equity to restrain the
majority stockholders from doing acts, in the name of the corporation,
which are ultra vires, yet where there isstatutory authority a majority
may dispose of the property and franchises to another corporation
against the will of the minority. Upon such a sale the purchasing corporatipn mortgaged the property and issued bonds for the same. A
minority stockholder in the seller, having dissented- from the sale,
brought suit against both corporations to set it aside, which resulted in a
decree upholding the sale, but providing that such stockholder, on tendering his stock to the purchasing company, should have a right to
receive an equal number of shares in the purchaser, or to have an execution against the same for the value of his stock. He elected to take the
latter course, and asked for the declaration of a lien prior to the mortgage, but this was denied. In a subsequent suit to foreclose the mortgage, he intervened, claiming an equitable lien prior thereto for the
value of his stock. It waslheld that he could assert no right or interest
in the corporate property so conveyed superior to the mortgage or the
bonds thereby secured: Farmers' L. & T. Co. v. R. R. C., Circuit Court
of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, JAcKSON, Circ. J., gebruary I4, 1893, 54 Fed.
Rep., 759.
VOTING.

9.

Proxy.

Where the charter of a railroad company provides that "each share
entitles the holder thereof to one vote, which vote may be given by said
stockholder in person, or by lawful proxy," and the appointment is
withdut limitation, a vote by the proxy binds the stockholder, whether
exercised in his interest or not, to the same extent as if the vote had
been cast in person": Md.& 0. R. R. Co. v. Nicholas, Supreme Court of
Alabama, COLEMAN, J., April 4, 1893, 12 Southern Rep., 723.

EVIDENCE.

CRIMINAL LAW.
J. BRvox.

Cases seleded by ROBERT

-CoNrnssioks.
1. PrisonerTied DuringExamination.
The fact that a prisoner .charged with murder was tied during i
preliminary examination by the committing magistrate is 'not a valid*
olbjection to the admission of a confession made by him during such
-examination when it does not apjear that he was tied in such a manner
as to produce pain, or to tend to induce or extort from him a confession;
but the practice of keeping the prisoner shackled or tied during such
examination is not to be commended: State v. Rogeis, Supreme Court
-of North Carolina, MtAcRAZ, J., April ii, 1893, 17 S. R. Rep., 297. IYORGnRY..
2. SigingName of Dead orIncapacitatedPerson.
it ii forgery to sign a dead person's name to an' instrument with
.intent to defraud, and a person is guilty of forgery if, with intent to
defraud, he signs an instrument with the name of a person who has no
legal capacity to execute it, or if he makes a false instrument by signing
a fictitious name: Brewer v. State, Court of Civil Appeals of Texas,
DAvMSON, J., April 22, E893, 22 S. W. Rep., 41.
MURDER.

3. Deliberation and Premeditation.'
Where, on a tfial for murder, the defendant's conduct for a few
seconds preceding the killing pointed to both deliberation aiid premeditation, an instruction that "if for any period. of time, no -matter
.how short, there was a conscious design to kill, the killing was murder
in the first degree," could not have misled the jury: Commonwealth v.
jBuccieri, Supreme Court of Pennsylvunia, DnAN, J., March 20, I893,
26 Atl. Rep., 228; 32 W. N. C., 13.

EVIDENCE.
Cases selected by ,HENRY N. SMAITZ.
eXPZRT WfTNZSS.

x. Compensatidn..
An expert witness, who testifies-for the people in a criminal case in
obedience to a subpoena, without making in advance any demand for
special compensation, is entitled to recover only the statutory witness
fees: Board of Commissioners v. Lee, Court of Appeals of Colorado,
BiSSEL, J., March 27, 1B93, 32 Pac. Rep., Si.
CONFvSSIONS. See CriminalLaw.

INSURANCE.

INSURANCE.
Cases selected by HoR-AcEi L. CHYNZY.
FIRE INSURANCE.
i. Action on Policy by Mortgagee.
A policy of fire insurance insured A in a given sum, part of it on
one property, part on another, loss payable to B "mortgagee; as his
interest may appear." B's mortgage covered only one of the properties
insured. Held, that B could sue on the policy in his own name, and
recover total loss'on both properties, not exceeding his debt, notwithstanding his mortgage covered only one of the properties insured. The
words, "as his interest may appear," do not refer to the mortgagee's
iitefest in the property, but to the amount of his mortgage debt; if, at
the loss, his debt had been paid, he would have no-interest; if still
unpaid, he would get all the compensation for all the loss, not exceeding,
however, his debt; it makes no difference that the property covered by
the mortgage and loss is only a part of the total loss, and not adequate to
pay the debt, the vhole loss from all the property shall go on the debt;
it was the debt under the mortgage designed to be s6cured: Colby v.
Parkersburg Ins. Co., Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia,
BRANNON, J., April i, x893, S. E. Rep., 3o3.

Ltn

INSU
.AN".
2. False Repmresentations.

'An applicant for insurance, in answer to the question to what extent
Held, that proof of a
he used alcoholic stimulants, answered "None."
single use of liquor was not sufficient to prove the answer untrue, but
that it would be necessary, for that purpose, to prove, a habit or custom
of using such stimulants : Grand, Lodge A. 0. U. .W., el al. v. Belcham,
Supreme Court of Illinois, CRAiG, J., April 3, 1893, 33 N. B. Rep., 886.
MARINE INSURANc".
3. Authority of Agent-Local Usage.
A well-defined local usage, wheitby marine insurance agents can
make binding contracts to take effect on the day of applica"tion without
consulting their superiors, is presumably known to a foreign company
engaged for years in insurance business at the place where the usage
obtains, and is sufficient to prevail over the private instructions of such
agents when the insured is in ignorance thereof, and is without notice of
facts sufficient to put him upon inquiry. The fact that a local agent has
no power to issue policies dqes not necessarily show that he is without
authority to make binding preliminary contracts of insurance: Green*wich Ins. Co. v. Waterman, Circuit Court of Appeals of United States,
o
Sixth Circuit, TArT, J., HAmMOND, J., dissenting, March 3 , 1893, 54
Fed. Rep., 839.
4. Cancellationof Policy-Mistakeof Fact.
Where a policy of marine insurance is canceled, by mutual consent,
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on the return of the unearned'premium, and neither party at the time
knew that the insured steamer had been lost, the-cancellation is voidable,
as made in ignorance of a material fact, and the insured is entitled t&
recover the amount of the policy less the returned premium: Duncan v.
New York Mut. Ins. Co., Court of Appeals of New York, O'BR=x, J.,
April Ii, I893, 33 N. R. Rep., 729.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC LAW.
Cases selected by

M &Y=

R. LoNsmTRi.

x. Interest of Lessee of Stall--Ejedmext by Eminent Domain..
The lessee of a stand or stall in a market has no such exclusive right
to the possession of his stall as he might have to a store or dwelling
house rented by him. He has no right to the ground covered by his
stall, as ground, and he has no estate in the building, or definiti leg l'standing that will enable him to recover his. stall by an action ofeet-,
ment if he should be wrongfully put out of-possession; and therefore'is
not entitled to damages from a railroad company which conle.mns tte
market house under its right of eminent domain. He must look elsewhere for his damage: Strickland v, Pennsylvania Raihoad Coinanr,.
tupreme Court of Pennsylvania, WnJxLLms, J., April 24, 1893, i 4 P.;"
348; 32 W. N. C., 211.
MUNICIPALITY.
2.

.

Lotal Improvements-NaagacbleSredms.

A
corporation cannot
cnicipal levy a speckal, assessment for widening a navigable river, like the hicago River, under its power "to m=iilocal improvements by specidl asessment," sinc the improvement bia.
navigable stream for the benefit of commerce is not a local improvement.
Any property owner affected by the proposed widening.of the river may
object on the ground of the city's want ofpower, although the United
States make no complaint, as it could under "tUe Act of Congress' of
September i9, 389o,
7, making it unlawful. "to alter or modify the
course, location, conditi6n or capacity of the channel" bf any navigable
waters of the United States, unless such change is approved by the Secretary of War: City of Chicago v. Law, Supiemei Court of Illinois,
CRAIG, J., March 31, 1893, 33 N. B. Rep., 855.
3. Obstructionto Sidewalk-Notice.
While an action against a municipality to r~cover damages for personal injuries caused by an unlawful.obstru~tio;n of the sidewalk cannobe sustained unless the city had noti , of this obstruction and .wasnegligent in not removing it, it is for the '*iny to"determine whether the
constant repetition of the act of placing machinery and castings upon
the sidewalk by an iron company, was such as to amount to a substantial
continuity of obstruction and so bind the city with notice, or was merely
in each instance"a separate and lawful temporary use of the sid,'walk;
and it is error for the Court to nonsuit a plaintiff producing somne evidence of suchlcontinuity of obstruction : Davis v. Corry City, Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, DIAN, J., May 8, 1893, 154 Pa., 598.

PLEADING AND PRACTICE.
PUBLIC OVFICERS.

4. Mandamus to Compel Acceptance of Office.
Mandamus will lie to compel acceptance of municipal office by one
who, possessing the requisite qualifications, has been duly appointed to
the same: People v. Williams, Supreme Court of Illinois, SHOPZ, 3.,
March 3r ,1893, 33 N. E. Rep., 849.
This question has not been previously decided in this country. See
Merrill on Mandamus, 145; Dillon on Municipal Corporations, 4th Ed.,
223.
See PRACTICE, 7.
RVENU: LAws.
s. SugarBounty-Assignmentfor the Benefit of Creditors.
The Sugar Bounty provided for in the Act of October I, i890, is not
a pure gratuity granted by the government, or a mere recompense for
personal services, but is compensation offered for the purpose of stimulating production; and when a producer accepts the offer and complies
with the statute, there is a contract between him and the government.
A claim for such bounty is a vested right constituting property subject to
be soldon execution, and will, therefore, pass under the insolvency laws
to an assignee- for the benefit of creditors: Calder v. Hefiderson, United
States Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, PARDEz, Circ. J.; January'
25, 17893, 54 Fe& Rep., 802.

MUTUAL RELATIONS.
HUSBAND AND WIVzE.

See PROPERTY, 4, 5; PLIAMIINi,

3, 4.

PLEADING AND PRACTICE.
Cases selected by Aimimus STzWART.
PLEADING.
ELECTION CONTBST."

x. Petition-Sufficiency.
In an election contest instituted in the Supreme Court, a petition
which alleges that the election judges in each and everyprecinct rejected
a large number of legal votes given for contestant, for the reason that the
cross was not placed in the proper position, is too indefinite: Smith v.
Harris, Supreme Court of Colorado, PER CURIAM, March 6, 1893, 32
Paec. Rep., 616.
JURISDICTION.
2. Action onjudgment Obtained in Another State-Plea tojurisdiction, Requisites of.
Where a party sued in one State on a judgment obtained against him
in a sister State undertakes to question the jurisdiction of the Court of
the latter State over him, his plea must regative by certain and positive

PLEADING AND PRACTICE.
avermenfs every fact upon which such jurisdiction can be legally pre-'
dicated. If by any reasonable intendment the facts alleged in the plea,
can exist, and the Court rendering the judgment could still have had
jurisdiction, the plea is bad: Sammis v. Wightman, Supreme Court of
Florida, RONPY, C.J., February i5,1893, 12 So. Rep., 526.
RUPLUVIN.
3. Allegation of Ownership by Married Woman.
In replevin by a married woman, where the complaint alleges that
she is the owner of the property, she need not show in her pleadings that
she acquired her title through one of the channels by which a married
woman is allowed to acquire separate property: Freeburger v. Caldwell,
Supreme Court of Washington, STiLpts, J., February I8, 1893, 32 Pac.
Rep., 732.
"VARIANCE.
4. ProPerlyof Hz1sband or Wife.
Where, in an action for damages to real estate, the petition alleges
that the property belongs to a married woman, one of the plaintiffs, and
the proof shows that it is either the common property of herself and
husband or the separate property of the husband, there is q fatal variance: Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Becht, Court of Civil Appeals of
Texas, WIrLAms, .J., March i6, 1893, 21 S. W. Rep., 971.
PRACTICE.
1FZDERAX, COURTS.
5. Supreme Court-Mandamus to Circuit Court of Afi,64alsCertiorari-Receivers.
Where the Circuit Court of Appeals, under the authority given it by'
Section 7 of the Judiciary Act of March 3, 189i, to entertain an appeal
from an interlocutory order "granting or continuing an injunction,"
entertains an appeal from an order appointing a receiver for a railroad.
-company and enjoining the disposition of its property, and niot only
modifies the injunction, but also directs the Circuit C6urt to discharge
the receiver and restore the property to the company, its action in the
latter respect, even if erroneous; is no ground for interference by the
Supreme Court by writ of mandamus, for the appeal from the injunctional part of'the decree was clearly authorized, and the case was within
-the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of Appeals.
Such a case is not one for the interposition of the Supreme Court by
writ of certiorari under Section 6 of the Judiciary Act of March 3, 1891,
for this branch of its jurisdiction is to be sparingly exercised; and the
,iecree of the Circuit Coart of Appeals was neither so important in its
immediate effect, nor so far-reaching in its consequefices, as to warrant
the Supreme Court in issuing the writ.
The question whether the Circuit Court of Appeals has authority to
entertain an appeal from a decree setting aside an order appointing a
receiver is not of such importance, even though the Court has exercised such authority, as to require the interposition of the Supreme

704

PLEADING AND PRACTICE.

Court, either by mandamus or certiorari for, even if the interlocutory
order could not be the subject of a separate appeal, it might be brought
before the Circuit Court of Appeals on appeal from the final decree in
the cause.
Where, however, upon an appeal from an order made in the Circuit
Court by the district judge, setting aside an order made .by the circuit
judge, the circuit judge takes part in the decision in the Circuit Court of
appeals, the question whether he was not disqualified to so take part
under Section 3 of the Judiciary Act of March 3, 1891, and whether the
decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals was not therefore void, is one
which deeply affects the administration of justice in that court; and, in
order to determine the same, the Supreme Court will issue a rule to show
cause why a Writ of certiorari shouldnot issue, and if it should be determined upon the hearing thereof that the circuit judge was disqualified,
and that the decree was therefore void, the writ will issue to bring up
and quash the same: American Construction Co. v. Jacksonville, T. &
K. W. Ry. Co., Supreme Court of the United States, GRAY, J., March 27,
1893, i3 Sup. Ct. Rep., 758.
6.

Supreme Court-Jursdiction-fandamus
to Circuit Courtof
Apeals.
The Supreme Court of the United States has no jurisdiction to issue
a writ of mandamus to the Circuit Court of Appeals to compel it to.
receive and consider new proofs in an admiralty appeal in a cause which
is vithin the legitimate jurisdiction pf that Court: n re "Hawkins,
Supreme Court of the United States, FuLLR, C. J., January 30, 1893,
13 Sup. Ct. Rep., 512.
The Supreme Court of the United States has no jurisdiction to control by mandamus the discretion of the Circuit Court in graniting or
refusing a.supersedeas upon -an appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals
from an interlocutory order granting or continuing an injunction: In reHaberman Manufficturing Co., Supreme Court of the United States,
BLATCEcORD, J., February 6, 1893, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep., 527.
MANDAMUS.

7. Title to Office.
While mandamus is not the appropriate mode of trying the questiov
of the strict title to an office, yet, in such a proceeding, brought to compel the respondent to approve the official bond tendered by the relator,
sufficient inquiry may be made to ascertain whether or not the relator'scertificate of election or appointment is pirima fade evidence of title to
the office: State ex rel. Truesdell v. Plambeck, County Judge, Supreme
Court of Nebraska, NORVAL, J., March 16, x893, 54 N. W. Rep., 667.
[The proper method of trying the title to an office is by quo warranto, and not mandamus, on the grounds that mandamus never lies
when there is any other adequate remedy, and that quo warrantofurnishes more complete redress: State v. Sullivan, 53 N. W. Rep., 677;
State v. Hamil, ii So. Rep., 892; Peo. v. Gottling, 133 N. Y., 569; S. C.,
30 N. E. Rep., 968 ; Contra, Luce v. Board of Ex'rs, 153 Mass., 1o8 ;
S. C., 26 N.
. Rep., 419; Keough v. Board of Aldermen (Mass.), 31
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N. R. Rep., 387. But where, as in the case above, the action is not
brought directly to try the title to office, but only involves it collaterally,"
there can be no valid objectiopl to inquiring.into it so far as is necessary
to the proper determination of the main question.]
See MuNIciPAL CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC LAW, 4.

PROPERTY.
Cases selected by WrLLI m A. DAvis.
COURTESY.

Election-Presumption-JudgmentAgainst Husband N9t a
Lien on the Land in whick He Has Courtesy.
Defendant, on his wife's decease, became tenant by courtesy in her
real estate; she also willed him her property for life with a right to use
whatever was necessary for his comfortable support. He did not elect
under which he would hold. Held, That it will be presumed that he
holds as teniant by the courtesy, and during the life of his children the
land cannot be taken by the foreclosure of a lien filed thereon, to satisfy
a judgment recovered against him on his indorsement of a note: Sill v.
White, Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut, PamNTIcE, J., CARPINTER, J., dissenting, December Io, 1892, 26 Atl. Rep., 396.
i.

DOWER.

Partnership Propierty-Firm of Lawyers Dealing -it Real
, .
Estate.
Land purchased bya firm for the purpose of selling again at a profit'
is to be treated as personalty, so far as may be necessary for settling up
the partnership affairs, and the right of dower is subject to the 4ebts of
the firm.
A firm of lawyers, engaged in the practice of their profession, may
extend their business to, and include that of buying and selling real
estate for profit, and such real estate should, in equity, be treated as
personalty in order to protect the rights of creditors and partners: Young
v. Thrasher, Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. I, MACIALANRA.,
Miarch 25, 1893, 21 S. W. Rep., 1i04.
2.

HIGHWAY.

Construction of Railroad- Changing Grade of Streets Damages.
A grant of a strip of land for railroad right of way does not carry
by implication a release of damages to property abutting on"a street, not.
in existence *whenthe road was built, which were caused by a change in
the grade of the railroad and the necessary extension of a fill upon the
street beyond the limits of the iight of way.
The right to change the grade of streets, inherent in a city council,
cannot be dilegated to a railroad company for its private advantage at
the expense of-property owners : Egbert v. Lake Shore & M. S. Rwy.
Co., Appellate Court of Indiana, GAVIN, J., March i6, 1893, 33 N. B.
Rep., 659.
3.

TORTS.
HUSBAND AND NNTIVE.

4. Conveyance before farriage.
Where a woman, in contemplation qf a marriage which afterwardI
takes place, voluntarily conveys her property without the consent of her
future husband, the record of the deed therefor before the marriage does
not prevent him from avoiding it as a fraud on his marital rights: Ferebee v. Pritchard, Supreme Court of North Carolina, SHEPHEriD, C. J.,
February 21, 1893, 16 S. R. Rep., 903.
s. Wife's Sepiarate Trust Estate-Powerto Charge.
Where land is conveyed, in contemplation of marriage, to a trustee
for the separate lise of the wife, with power to convey "by deed, in
.vhich her husband and trustee must unite," a mortgage executed by the
husband and wife is void for the trustee's failure to join therein: Mayo
v. Farrar, Supreme Court of Norti Carolina, AvERY, J., February 21,
1893, 16 S. E. Rep., 91o.
WATBR RIGHTS.

6. Cutting Ice-Injury to Dam Owner.
The owner of a pondage right is not the absolute owner of the ice
forming on the pond, but has the right to have it remain -when such continuance is useful in the legitimate exercise of the right to use the water
as a motive power for his mills, and the owner of the soil cannot cut the
ice for sale where its removal works an actual 'injury to such rights :
Howe v. Andrews, Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut, THAYBR, J.,
Dedember 6, 1892, 26 At. Rep., 394.

TORTS.
Cases selected by ALEXANDER DuRBn

LAUXR.

ARREST.

i. Arrest Without Warrant-Damages.
In an action for damages for illegal arrest, by reason of the deputies
not having a warrant in their possession at thetime of the arrest, plaintiff
was entitled to damages sustained by him by reason of his detention
under such illegal arrest to the time he was delivered to the officer having a warrant therefor, and defendant's contention that his damages
were not greater by reason, of the deputies not having a warrant than
they would have been had the warrant been in their possession, was held
untenable: Cabell v'. Arnold, Court of Civil Appeals of Texas,HEAD, J.,
March 30, 1893, 22 S. W. Rep., 62.
ASSAULT AND BATTERY.

2. College "Rush."
A student who rushes upon and injures an unsuspecting fellow student who is not participating in a college " rush," is guilty of an assault
and battery, and liable in damages, notwithstanding the fact that he waspushed against the plaintiff by other students without anticipating the
consequences: Markley v. Whitman, Supreme. Court of Indiana,
LONG, J., April 7, 1893, 54 N. W. Rep., 763.
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LIBEa.
3- PrivilegedPublications.
To publish of a public officer that "he is said to have been in the'
workhouse and to have had a criminal record," is libelous per se, and is
not privileged, on the ground that the words related to a matter of public
interest and were spoken or published in good faith: Post Pub. Co. v.
Maloney, Supreme Court of Ohio, WuIAumS, J., January 31; 1893, 33.
N. E. Rep., 921.
For a collected list of cases upon the above subject see article in 30'
American'Law Register, 556, et seq.
SEDUCTION.
4. Definition of Seduction-Damagesfor Rape.
Seduction is the act of persuading a woman to surrender her chastity.
In its ordinary acceptation it implies a betrayal of confidence. There
must be something more than a mere reluctance on the part of the
woman to commit the act; her consent must be obtained by fla'ttery,
false promises, artifice, urgent importunity based on professions of
attachment, or the like, for the woman by the man, and in reliance upon
these persuasions and influenced solely by such promises, flattery, artifice and urgenmt iportunity, she then being chaste, surrenders herperson and chastity to the alleged seducer.
Where, in an action for damages for the seduction of the plaiitiff,
whereby she became pregnant and had a child, the evidence showed the
offence was committed when she was unconscious from the effects of
drink administered by the defendant, the defendant was guilty of rape;
such a disclosure does not defeat plaintiff's recovery, but aggravates the
injury, and furnishes ground for the award of exemplary damages.." In.
this case the jury awarded the plaintiff, a girl .x6 years and io monthold and employed as a hotel servant, $25,ooo.
Except as to the use of force, the elements forming the measure of
damages in a case either of seduction or rape are very similar. Where a
parent sues for the seduction of his daughter, and consequent loss of'
service, and it appears that the intercourse was accomplished by force,
such a showing will not defeat the action, but will aggravate the injury.
While the recovery of the parent is based upon a different principle
from that involved where the female is the complainant, yet the same
rule is applied to her case. If plaintiff was unconscious from the effects.
of wine at the time defendant had intercourse with her, her cause "of"
action was not defeated by reason of such fact: Marshall v. Taylor,.
Supreme Court of California, GARoUTTn, J., March 31, 1893, 32 Pac.

Rep., 867.
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Cases selected byMAURIcE CG.BEixNAP.
ADMINISTRATOR..
x. Funds ofDecedentin Bank-Rightsof Administratorde bonisnon and PersonalRep resentativesof Deceased Administrator Thereto.
Where an administrator has a deposit of intestate in a bank trans.-
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ferred to his credit as administrator, his personal representatives are, on
his death, entitled to receive it, and the bank,-having paid it to them,
cannot be held liable by intestate's administrator de bonis non : Sibbs v.
Phila. Saving Fund Society, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, WILLIAMs,
J., February 20, 1893, 25 Atl. Rep., 1119; 32 W. N. C., 68; 153 Pa., 345.
GIFT MORTIS CAUSA.
2.

Delivery.

The donor upon her deathbed, in a room of which she was, if not a
mere visitor, at most a joint occupant with the donee, gave the donee
the keys to two trunks lying at the foot of the bd on which she, the
donor, was at the'same time, saying to the donee that the trunks and
their contents were hers. Held, a complete gift mortis causa: Debinson
v. Emmons, Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, BARXXR, 3.,
April 4, 1893, 33 N. B. Rep., 706.
WILrs.
3.

Evidence.
Descrifition of Prop6erty-Mistake-Extrinsic

Where a testator devised property as "the tract of land on which I
now live," and the particular description of the same land in the will by
couses and distances shows a palpable omission, the general description
will prevail over the particular description, and a prior unattested will,
proved to be genuine, is admissible, as extrinsic evidence, to remove the
ambiguity in the later will, and to identify the subject of the devis,
since such former will is in effect a written declaration by the testator as
to the subject-matter of his bounty: Thompson v. Thompson, Supreme
Coprt of Missouri, SHERWOOD, J., M~rch 20, 1893, 21 S. W. Rep.,
1085.
4. Perbetuiies.
A gift by will, which is no. to take effect until a certain sum for
another purpose shall have been received out of the income of an estate,
will not be declared void, for the reason that it possibly may be deferred
beyond the time allowed by the rule against perpetuities, where the
Court can see with judicial certainty, regard being had to the incomeyielding quality of the estate, that the sum specified will be raised long
before such time, especially where the gift is to a charity: In re Lennig's
Estate, Supreme Court of ennsylvania, PBR CURIAM, affirming PZINROSE, J., of the Orphans' .Court of Philadelphia, February 6, 1893, 25
AUt. Rep., 1049; 154 Pa., 209.

5. Undue Influence-Ratification.
Where a will has been obtained by fraud and undue influence no
subsequent ratification would validate it without a formal re-execution or
republication: Haines v. Hayden, Supreme Court of Michigan, MoNTGomzRy, J., April 21, 1893, 54 N. W. Rep., 911.

